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SUMMARY 
 
This research investigates the efficiency and equity impacts of the cropland rental 
market in rural Vietnam and attempts to identify the determinants and importance of 
transaction costs impeding this market. A generalised ordered logit model with shifting 
thresholds accounting for effects of transaction costs associated with market 
participation was specified and estimated using pooled data extracted from the Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Surveys of 2004 and 2008. The findings show that the 
cropland rental market reduced imbalances in factor endowments, transferring cropland 
to those households more willing and able to farm. Equity advantages were also 
revealed as cropland transferred from relatively land-rich to relatively land-poor 
households, allowing young farmers to ‘scale the agricultural ladder’. However, the 
market is constrained by transaction costs that effect lessors and lessees differently. It is 
recommended that the Vietnamese government should complete its land registration 
programme and consider relaxing restrictions on the use of wetlands to grow crops other 
than rice. It should also focus on improving access to all-weather roads as this 
encourages participation on both sides of the rental market whereas better access to 
communications infrastructure was found to promote only the supply side.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam recorded impressive economic growth and poverty reduction during the 1990’s 
in response to market-oriented policy reforms (World Bank, 2006a), including 
ambitious land reforms in 1988, 1993 and 2003. However, there are concerns that the 
reforms have not produced institutions strong enough to support efficient markets in all 
sectors of the economy, and that growth has slowed – particularly in the agricultural 
sector (Gaiha and Thapa, 2007; Hansen and Diaz, 2008). Vietnam remains one of the 40 
lowest-income countries in the world (World Bank, 2009). 
 
More than 80 per cent of the poor are located in rural Vietnam, where their livelihoods 
depend primarily on agriculture (VASS, 2007). The average area of cropland operated 
by farmers in Vietnam is only 0.63 hectares (VASS, 2007). Not only are the farms 
amongst the world’s smallest (Eastwood et al, 2010), they are also highly fragmented. 
Some 75 million cropland parcels are owned by almost 12 million rural households 
(Hung et al, 2007; Kerkvliet, 2006) resulting in land fragmentation and land losses 
between plots (Phuong, 2009). There is considerable evidence that farms are cost 
inefficient (Hung et al, 2007; Kompas, 2004; Rios and Shively, 2005; Vu, 2006). As a 
result, farm incomes are tightly constrained by very small farm sizes, highly fragmented 
cropland holdings and cost inefficiency. 
 
In theory, an efficient land market should help to resolve these problems by providing 
aspiring farmers with opportunities to consolidate land and to expand their operations. 
Vietnam’s 2003 Land Law still imposes strict ceilings on land ownership (3 hectares) so 
that opportunities to consolidate and expand farming operations through the land sale 
market are very limited. Vietnam therefore requires an efficient land rental market to 
promote growth in agriculture and to raise rural incomes. Previous studies of cropland 
markets in Vietnam (Deininger and Jin, 2008; Do and Iyer, 2008; Ravallion and van de 
Walle, 2003) were conducted in the context of Vietnam’s 1993 Land Law. The 2003 
Land Law strengthened tenure security by broadening the bundle of land rights assigned 
to landholders. In theory, this should have enhanced the efficiency of rental markets for 
cropland and strengthened farming household incentives to invest in agriculture. 
 
Given the very small areas operated by farmers and their persistently low incomes, it is 
reasonable to ask if rental markets for cropland in Vietnam are efficient or not. This 
paper presents part of a broader study undertaken by the first author with guidance from 
the other authors (Huy, 2013). It is hypothesised that rental markets for cropland remain 
inefficient in many parts of rural Vietnam, preventing farmers from consolidating 
cropland parcels, growing their farm enterprises, adopting new technology, and 
increasing both their incomes and those of non-farming rural households. This paper 
examines factors that motivate farm household decisions to participate in the rental 
market for cropland in rural Vietnam, the efficiency and equity impacts of these 
transactions, and the efficiency of the market itself. A generalised ordered logit model 
with shifting thresholds accounting for effects of transaction costs associated with 
market participation is postulated and estimated using pooled data (for the sub-sample 
of rural households that farm, or that have farmland) extracted from the Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS) of 2004 and 2008. These surveys were 
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam with technical support from the 
World Bank. 
  
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing literature suggests that voluntary land rental transactions have both efficiency 
and equity advantages (Crookes and Lyne, 2003). Allocative efficiency improves 
because the market imposes an opportunity cost on idle and underutilised cropland, 
which creates incentives for voluntary transactions that transfer this land to more 
effective farmers, i.e. farmers willing and able to make more profitable use of the land 
(Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1991). Cost efficiency improves because the rental market 
allows farmers to exchange and consolidate cropland parcels (Norton, 2004).  Perhaps 
more important than these static efficiency gains, the rental market allows effective 
farmers to grow the scale of their farming operations over time, making investments in 
knowledge and new technology more profitable; larger farms increase the revenue that 
can be gained from new technology while reducing the unit costs of adoption (Kille and 
Lyne, 1993). These efficiency gains may further translate into higher levels of output 
and better employment opportunities on farms and in service industries (Deininger and 
Jin, 2005; Vranken and Swinnen, 2006). In addition, efficient cropland rental markets 
help overcome imperfections in markets for credit, insurance, management, draught 
power and machinery through interlinked contracts (Bardhan, 1989; Otsuka et al, 1992; 
Sadoulet et al, 2001). 
 
Viewed from an equity perspective, a rental market offers these efficiency gains without 
the threat of distress sales and a ‘landless class’ problem as it entails only a temporary 
transfer of certain use rights (Crookes and Lyne, 2003; Deininger and Jin, 2005). 
Lessors and lessees would not transact voluntarily unless the rental transaction creates 
greater utility for both parties than the costs it imposes on them. Furthermore, land 
rental markets allow prospective farmers to ‘scale the agricultural ladder’ while also 
providing lessors with an opportunity to gain experience in non-farm occupations 
(Crookes and Lyne, 2003; Deininger 2003). 
 
Agricultural land scarcity is the basis for the economic value of land and for the 
emergence of agricultural land markets (Binswanger et al, 1995; Feder et al, 1988). 
However, land markets will not develop in the absence of secure land tenure and low 
transaction costs (Lyne and Thomson, 1998). Security of land tenure defined by Place et 
al (1994) involves three components: breadth, duration, and assurance of land rights. 
The breadth or robustness of land rights refers to the quantity (or bundle) of rights, such 
as rights of access, use, exclusion and transfer, under a legal or customary framework 
assigned to an individual or organisation. Duration of rights means the length of time 
during which the validity of a specified right or set of rights is legally protected. 
Assurance of land rights signifies the certainty with which rights and duration are 
exercised.  
 
This definition signals an inverse relationship between security of tenure and transaction 
costs in land rental markets (Lyne 2009; Lyne et al, 1997). In the case of inadequate 
breadth of rights, for example, a potential lessee may be faced with prohibitively high 
transaction costs of discovering the owner of a land parcel and establishing a contract if 
there are many legitimate claimants with inclusive rights to the parcel. Risks that arise 
from inadequate assurance of land rights can also be viewed as a source of transaction 
costs (Lyne et al, 1997). Examples of risks stemming from inadequate assurance of 
rights include uncertainty about institutions to resolve disputes, complex and costly 
  
procedures to establish or defend contracts, or unpredictable judgements (Lyne et al, 
1997). All of these reduce land tenure security and raise transaction costs. 
 
Transaction costs can be usefully divided into ex ante and ex post components 
(Williamson, 1985). Ex ante transaction costs are mainly fixed costs associated with 
costs of searching for markets and partners, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding 
contracts. Hence, ex ante transaction costs tend to rise when physical infrastructure is 
poor (specifically roads and telecommunications) (Lyne, 2009); accessing necessary 
documents or securing approval from local officials is time-wasting and costly; or the 
legal fees of notary and registration of land transfer are high (de Janvry et al, 2001b). Ex 
post transaction costs are largely variable costs associated with monitoring, 
renegotiating and enforcing contracts, and losses or risk of losses arising from the 
opportunistic behaviour of lessees and lessors (Skoufias, 1995).  
   
Transaction costs effectively drive a wedge between potential lessees and lessors; these 
costs tend to lower the price offered by the potential lessee while raising the potential 
lessor’s reserve price, creating a ‘price band’ in land rental markets and excluding those 
within the band who find it unprofitable to participate (Crookes and Lyne, 2003; Key et 
al, 2000). When land is highly fragmented, as in Vietnam, potential market participants 
will face pronounced unit ex ante transaction costs. In the case of prohibitively high ex 
ante fixed transaction costs, the costs preclude contracting and are therefore 
unobservable (Crookes and Lyne, 2003). An increase in ex post transaction costs tends 
to reduce the quantity of land transacted as they are largely variable costs. It follows 
that insecure tenure and high transaction costs prevent land rental markets from 
functioning efficiently. 
 
Vietnam initiated ambitious and comprehensive land reforms in 1988. The Land Law of 
1988 mandated the break-up of collective farms and allocation of exclusive use rights to 
individuals. By 2007, more than 80 per cent of the agricultural land had been registered 
with Land Use Certificates that conferred a relatively broad bundle of use and transfer 
rights on landholders (Phuong, 2008). It was anticipated that enhanced tenure security 
would motivate farming households to invest more labour and capital in land. The 2003 
Land Law intended to strengthen these incentives and promote allocative efficiency by 
allowing subletting and by removing earlier limitations imposed on lease duration (less 
than or equal to three years in the 1993 Land Law). Furthermore, the extended use of 
Land Use Certificates (LUCs) as a mortgage, guarantee or capital share was expected to 
increase the supply credit to farming households. 
 
Despite the impressive success of its land reforms, there is evidence of widespread 
inadequacy in the breadth of rights to cropland in Vietnam. Possession of a LUC does 
not prevent local authorities from zoning wetland for rice production. Markussen et al. 
(2009) found that, at plot level, about 36 per cent of sampled plots ‘must grow rice in all 
seasons’ despite the user’s preference for other crops. The duration and assurance of 
land rights are also constrained. According to the 2003 Land Law, the right to land 
cultivated with annual crops expires after 20 years, and the limit for land growing 
perennial crops is 50 years. Although LUCs may be renewed at the end of the period 
(the first certificates expire in 2013), renewal is conditional on an official’s assessment 
that the farmer has and will continue use the land for its certified purpose. When 
making its assessment, local government can (and may have a political incentive to) 
adjust rights (Kerkvliet, 2006). Huyen and Ha (2009) provide evidence of land disputes 
  
that government has been slow to resolve, and of local governments expropriating land 
‘in the public interest’ without offering fair compensation. These deficiencies in tenure 
security raise transaction costs. High transaction costs have also been attributed to 
cumbersome and costly bureaucratic procedures for transferring farmland use rights 
(Phuong, 2008; World Bank, 2002) and to poor physical infrastructure, particularly 
rural roads and telecommunications (Joint-Donors, 2009).  
 
Huy (2013, pp 77-84) presents descriptive statistics computed from 2004 and 2008 
VHLSS data suggesting an improvement in the efficiency of the rental market over his 
study period; The proportion of farm households making use of the rental market 
increased from 16.9 per cent in 2004 to 18.4 per cent in 2008. The average area 
operated by farming households was not significantly higher in 2008 than it was in 2004 
but the data revealed a consolidation of parcels, indicated by a reduction in the average 
number of plots operated. Despite these gains, it is apparent that the rental market is not 
efficient. More than 80 per cent of the sample households did not participate in the 
market. This is high compared to corresponding estimates of 54 per cent for India, 46 
per cent for Eritrea and 37 per cent for rural Bangladesh. In addition, approximately five 
per cent of sample households left cropland idle, supporting the view that transaction 
costs are high - fixed ex ante transaction costs in particular. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ITS RESULTS 
 
The purpose of the analysis presented in this section is to investigate the efficiency and 
equity impacts of the cropland rental market in rural Vietnam, and to identify the 
determinants of transaction costs in order to understand their existence and significance. 
To achieve these goals, a generalised ordered logit model with shifting thresholds 
accounting for the effects of transaction costs associated with market participation was 
specified and estimated, using the pooled data from the VHLSS04 and VHLSS08 for 
the sub-sample of rural households that farm or have farmland. No attempt is made to 
measure the absolute size of transaction costs as transaction costs are often unobserved 
(Goetz, 1992; Key et al, 2000). The econometric model is explained in detail by Huy 
(2013, pp 122-131). Due to space constraints this paper emphasises the results of the 
model and their implications for policy.  
 
In the absence of transaction costs, the market rent is determined by the intersection of 
the supply of available cropland to the market and the demand for cropland for 
agricultural production. The demand for cropland, in turn, derives from the value of the 
marginal product of cropland, which is the value of the agricultural production that can 
be attributed to the next unit of cropland (implicit land rent). The value of the marginal 
product of cropland, which can be derived from the production function, is the product 
of the marginal productivity of cropland for the production of certain crops and their 
market prices. Hence, a lessee is willing to pay rent based only on the result of the 
agricultural production process because he or she receives only the benefits derived 
from using the land as a productive factor (Trivelli, 1997; Binswanger et al, 1995). For 
this study, the value of the marginal product of cropland is defined as the net return to 
land, accounting for the income remaining after paying for all productive factors and 
inputs (except land) involved in the agricultural production process. Let e(•) be a well-
behaved net income function with é(•) being the first derivative with respect to 
cropland, and let Ṥh denote the potential value of the marginal product of cropland for 
household h in cropland autarky. Then Ṥh can be written as a linear expression of é(•) as: 
  
 
Ṥh = é(Xh) = α + ß + εh       (1) 
   
where Ṥh is assumed to be continuous and take values from - to +; α is the intercept; 
Xh is a (K1) vector of explanatory variables with ß being a (K1) vector of associated 
parameters; and εh is the random error term. 
 
In the presence of transaction costs associated with cropland rental market participation, 
the costs cause a gap between rented-in and rented-out prices, creating a ‘price band’ 
(Crookes and Lyne, 2003; Key et al, 2000). For convenience, let rh(TRC
i) denote the 
effective rent paid by household h written as a function of transaction costs, which 
equals the market rent plus transaction costs associated with renting in land; and 
rh(TRC
o) denote the effective rent received by household h written as a function of 
transaction costs, which equals the market rent minus transaction costs associated with 
renting out land. Accordingly, the 'price band' implies that rh(TRC
i)-rh(TRC
o)>0 and this 
gap is an indicator of the size of transaction costs when using the market. For this study, 
it is assumed that a household cannot simultaneously be both a lessee and a lessor, 
given the existence of transaction costs. The assumption is reasonable in the Vietnam 
context where there only about 0.4 per cent of households in the sample participate in 
both sides of the cropland rental market. 
  
With the existence of transaction costs, a rural household's decision on market 
participation is based on its potential value of marginal product of cropland under land 
autarky and transaction costs associated with market participation. The household is 
assumed to become a lessor if its potential value of marginal product of cropland is 
lower than the effective rent received, i.e. Ṥh<rh(TRCo). In contrast, the household 
becomes a lessee if its potential value of marginal product of cropland is higher than the 
effective rent paid, i.e. Ṥh>rh(TRCi). Finally, the household does not participate in the 
market if its potential value of marginal product of cropland lies between the effective 
rent received and the effective rent paid, i.e., rh(TRC
o) ≤ Ṥh ≤ rh(TRCi). In other words, 
no land adjustment occurs inside the 'price band'.  
 
Being an abstract construct, the potential value of the marginal product of cropland for 
household h in cropland autarky, Ṥh is an underlying continuous but latent process. 
However, the outcome of the household’s decision on market status (i.e. being a lessor, 
non-participant, or lessee) can be observed. The discussion in the preceding paragraph 
suggests that there are only three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
regimes of the cropland rental market that can be ranked in order of the latent value of 
land's marginal productivity, Ṥh, for farming household h. Accordingly, the observed 
market participation regime for farming household h can be tied to the latent variable Ṥh 
by a non-linear probability model of ordinal outcomes in a form: 
 
= 1 for the lessor regime  if -∞ < Ṥh ≤ 𝜇1 
Rh = 2 for the autarkic regime if 𝜇1 < Ṥh ≤ 𝜇2    (2) 
= 3 for the lessee regime  if 𝜇2 < Ṥh ≤ +∞ 
 
where Rh is an index taking on values of 1, 2 and 3 in ascending order and 𝜇1=rh(TRCo) 
and 𝜇2=rh(TRCi) are thresholds. 
 
  
A generalised ordered logit model was used to estimate order response probabilities for 
the regimes in equation 2, to overcome the limitations of a parallel-lines model 
(Williams, 2006) and to allow the thresholds (cut points) to depend on a number of 
proxy variables for transaction costs. In other words, transaction costs - and hence the 
market regime of a household, which is tied to the household's latent productivity of 
cropland - are household specific. In this study the threshold equations were expressed 
as linear functions of variables measuring observed sources of transaction costs, such as 
the share of a household’s cropland registered with LUCs and the presence of an all-
weather road in the commune. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present and define the variables used to explain market participation and 
the thresholds respectively. Most of the variables in table 1 are self explanatory. To 
capture the land quality that is assumed to systematically differ across four topologies in 
which households located, dummy variables were introduced for three topologies, i.e. 
DELTA, MIDLAND and MOUNTAIN. The coastal topology served as the default and 
was omitted from the model. As the value of the marginal product of cropland and 
hence market participation is also affected by output market prices, a regional consumer 
price index, REGIONCPI (the value in January 2004 prices with the rural area of the 
Red River Delta as the base region), was used to control for differences in levels of 
output market prices across regions. Regional dummy variables for seven Vietnam 
regions, REGION2 to REGION8 (Red River Delta served as the default region), were 
also included to control for differences in rural infrastructure, weather and other 
unobserved factors that vary systematically across regions. 
 
The drivers of transaction costs, including tenure insecurity, presented in table 2 warrant 
further explanation. The variable ENDOWTITLED, defined as the share of endowed 
cropland registered with land use certificates, was included in the model to capture the 
effect of titling on transaction costs and hence participation in the cropland rental 
market. Whether or not the registration of land use certificates has promoted the 
cropland rental market in rural Vietnam remains an empirical question as titling 
programmes and their outcomes tend to be context specific 
 
RICEZONING, measured as the ratio of rice sown area to total sown area, was intended 
to capture transaction costs incurred by market participants due to the limited breadth 
and assurance of land rights attributed to the actions of local authorities that frequently 
prevent farmers from converting rice land to other more profitable crops. The dummy 
variable LANDDISPUTE, scoring one for communes with land conflicts and disputes 
and zero otherwise, was included to capture risks at the commune level, which arise 
from both inadequate assurance and inadequate breadth of land rights. Like zoning, 
LANDDISPUTE is expected to impact negatively on market participation. Ownership 
of a telephone, OWNPHONE, and a motorised vehicle, OWNVEHICLE, were viewed 
as proxy variables for fixed transaction costs associated with market participation. 
Households that own these assets are expected to face lower transaction costs when 
participating in the cropland rental market. Commune specific proxy variables for fixed 
transaction costs were also included in the model as measures of access to physical 
infrastructure. Transaction costs were expected to be lower, and rental market 
participation higher, in communes that have radio broadcast systems 
(RADIOSTATION) to disseminate local news and information, roads with permanent 
surfaces that can be negotiated by cars (CMNROAD) and a local market serving as a 
forum for the exchange of information and social interaction (CMNMARKET). 
  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables Explaining Rental Market Participation 
Variables Description 
Lessors 
 
(n=820) 
Non-
participants 
(n=9514) 
Lessees 
 
(1,096) 
MKTREGIME Cropland rental market regimes 1 2 3 
ENDOWAREA Cropland endowment (ha) 0.51 0.70 0.40 
ENDOWPLOT No. of endowed cropland plots 3.50 3.70 3.50 
DELTA Delta commune (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.71 0.48 0.61 
MIDLAND Midland commune (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.06 0.07 0.06 
MOUNTAIN Mountainous commune (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.19 0.40 0.28 
HHLDSIZE Adult equivalent household size (persons)1 2.54 3.20 3.08 
CHILDDEPCY Child dependency ratio 0.15 0.24 0.30 
WIDOW Widow-headed household (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.24 0.11 0.09 
HEADAGE Age of the head (years) 57.84 48.80 43.89 
HEADAGE2 Square of head age 3,603 2,562 2,058 
HHLDEDU Education of the household (yrs) 8.57 9.08 9.31 
EXPERIENCE Farming experience of the household (yrs) 15.56 21.66 20.60 
SELFFARM Self-employed farmer (1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.35 0.61 0.60 
EXTENSION Visits by extension officers to commune 9.58 8.79 8.35 
FARMWAGE Commune average farm wage (1000VND/hr) 3.82 3.54 3.70 
FARMASSET Value of farm assets (1000VND)2 4,238 4,660 5,147 
REMITTANCE Annual Income from remittances (1000VND) 3,017 1,728 1,548 
LOANVALUE Total loan amount (1000VND) 6,542 4,489 5,572 
REGIONCPI Regional CPI (Rural Red River Delta=1) 1.02 1.03 1.02 
REGION2 North East (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.10 0.18 0.15 
REGION3 North West (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.02 0.07 0.03 
REGION4 North Central Coast (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.11 0.13 0.16 
REGION5 South Central Coast (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.09 0.09 0.09 
REGION6 Central Highlands (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.02 0.07 0.05 
REGION7 South East (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.07 0.07 0.06 
REGION8 Mekong River Delta (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.20 0.18 0.13 
YEAR Time dummy  (1 if 2008, 0 if 2004) 0.57 0.49 0.47 
1  The measure of adult equivalent assigns a value of 1 to the working-age adults, 0.7 to each aged 
member and 0.5 to each child 
2   Excludes the value of land  
Source:  Computed from VHLSS04 and VHLSS08 
 
The dummy variable, ETHNICITY - scoring one if the commune has more than one 
ethnic group, and zero otherwise - accounts for language barriers and lower mutual trust 
that may serve to raise transaction costs. Similarly, the dummy variable RELIGION, 
scoring one if the commune has more than one religious group and zero otherwise, is 
introduced to capture diversity in belief and norms that could discourage people from 
exchanging information. 
 
  
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables Driving Transaction Costs 
Variables Description 
Mean 
(n=11,430 ) 
S.D. 
ENDOWTITLED Share of endowed cropland area with LUC (%) 76.5 38.8 
RICEZONING Rice zoning index (ratio of rice sown area  to total 
sown area) 
0.54 0.38 
LANDDISPUTE Commune has land conflicts and disputes (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.37 0.48 
OWNPHONE Household owns a telephone (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.31 0.46 
RADIOSTATION Commune has a radio relay station (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.77 0.42 
OWNVEHICLE Household owns a motorised vehicle (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.56 0.50 
CMNROAD Commune has all-weather roads (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.62 0.49 
CMNMARKET Commune has a local market (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.61 0.49 
ETHNICITY Commune has diverse ethnic groups (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.55 0.50 
RELIGION Commune has diverse religions (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.57 0.50 
Source:  Computed from VHLSS04 and VHLSS08 
 
The parameters of the generalised ordered logit model, including those of the threshold 
equations, were estimated using the maximum likelihood method with Stata11.2SE 
software. Initially, a global test of the parallel-lines assumption was conducted using 
both Brant and Likelihood Ratio tests. The test results rejected the standard ordered 
logit model and favoured the generalised ordered logit model at the one per cent level of 
probability. All of the variables used to estimate the model had variance inflation 
factors less than ten. This suggests that the estimated model is free of any serious 
multicollinearity (Belsley et al, 2004). Individual parameter estimates are presented in 
table 3 (variables explaining rental market participation) and table 4 (drivers of 
transaction costs explaining rental market participation).  
  
When interpreting the estimates in table 3 it is important to remember that market 
regimes were coded in ascending order, i.e. 1 for lessors, 2 for non-participants, and 3 
for lessees, where these scores are tied to the latent value of the marginal product of 
cropland. A positive coefficient estimated for an explanatory variable therefore 
indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable implicitly leads to higher marginal 
product of cropland. This, in turn, makes it more likely that the household would shift to 
a higher category of market regimes than its current one, given the prevailing market 
rental and associated transaction costs, when using the market. By contrast, negative 
coefficients indicate that higher values of the explanatory variable increase the 
likelihood of being in the current or a lower market regime. Given this interpretation the 
estimated results are, with one exception, consistent with a priori expectations.  
 
Among the traditional factors of agricultural production, the coefficients estimated for 
endowments of cropland (ENDOWAREA) and plots (ENDOWPLOT) are negative, 
while the estimated coefficients of family labour (HHLDSIZE) and farm capital 
(FARMASSET) are positive. All of these estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the one per cent level of probability. The implication is that the rental 
market transfers cropland from relatively land-abundant but labour- and capital-poor 
rural households to those with relatively less cropland endowment but more family 
labour and farm assets. This is in line with findings in KwaZulu (Crookes and Lyne, 
2003; Lyne, 2009), China (Jin and Deininger, 2009) and Ethiopia (Holden et al, 2011). 
This evidence supports the view that the cropland rental market promotes efficient land 
use and reduces imbalances in factor endowments at household level, leading to greater 
  
equalisation of the shadow prices for cropland, family labour and farm capital across 
rural households. 
 
Table 3: Motives for Market Participation and Outcomes of the Cropland Rental Market 
Variables Description Estimates 
ENDOWAREA Cropland endowment (ha) - 0.13** 
ENDOWPLOT No. of endowed cropland plots - 0.15** 
DELTA Delta commune (dummy) - 0.22 
MIDLAND Midland commune (dummy) - 0.21 
MOUNTAIN Mountainous commune (dummy) - 0.18 
HHLDSIZE Adult equivalent household size  0.093** 
CHILDDEPCY Child dependency ratio  0.84** 
WIDOW Widow headed household (dummy) - 0.067 
HEADAGE Age of the head (years) - 0.042** 
lnHEADAGE2 Ln1 Square of head age  0.24 
HHLDEDU Education of the household (yrs)  0.026* 
EXPERIENCE Farming experience of the household (yrs)  0.018** 
SELFFARM Self-employed farmer (dummy)  0.30** 
EXTENSION Visits by extension officers to commune - 0.0054* 
FARMWAGE Commune average farm wage (1000VND/hr)  0.091** 
lnFARMASSET Ln Value of farm assets (1000VND)  0.086** 
lnREMITTANCE Ln Annual Income from remittances (1000VND) - 0.015 
lnLOANVALUE Ln Total loan amount (1000VND)  0.020** 
REGIONCPI Regional CPI (Rural Red River Delta =1) - 1.37 
REGION2 North East (dummy)  0.18 
REGION3 North West (dummy) - 0.17 
REGION4 North Central Coast (dummy)  0.20* 
REGION5 South Central Coast (dummy)  0.17 
REGION6 Central Highlands (dummy)  0.47* 
REGION7 South East (dummy)  0.46* 
REGION8 Mekong River Delta (dummy)  0.35** 
YEAR Time dummy  (1 if 2008, 0 otherwise) - 0.17 
 Observations  11,430 
 Log likelihood - 5,653 
 Wald chi2(47)   1,548 
 Prob > chi2      0.000 
1 Ln is the natural logarithm 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level of probability, respectively 
Source: Computed from VHLSS04 and VHLSS08 
 
Specialisation effects are also evident. It is interesting to observe that the estimated 
coefficient of the household head's age (HEADAGE) is negative and statistically 
significant, while the estimated coefficients of the household's education (HHLDEDU), 
farming experience (EXPERIENCE), commitment to farming (SELFFARM) and access 
to cash (LOANVALUE) are positive and statistically significant. These estimates 
suggest that the rental market transfers cropland to younger, full-time farmers and 
households that have more farming experience, better education and greater access to 
  
credit. In short, the market transfers cropland to more effective farmers, i.e. to those 
who are more willing and able to farm.  
 
Equity impacts of the cropland rental market are also evident. For instance, the negative 
coefficient estimated for ENDOWAREA suggests that rental transactions tend to 
equalise farm sizes, with cropland transferred from land-rich to land-poor households. 
Interestingly, the negative coefficient of the household head's age seems to support the 
hypothesis that the rental market allows young prospective farmers to ‘scale the 
agricultural ladder’. Similarly, the results show that households with more dependent 
children (CHILDDEPCY) rent in extra cropland – presumably to help meet their higher 
subsistence needs. The coefficients estimated for WIDOW and REMITTANCE are not 
statistically significant but both have negative signs. A negative coefficient for WIDOW 
is consistent with the view that the rental market allows widows, who have few means 
of generating farm income, to earn rental income or a crop share by renting out their 
land. Likewise, a negative coefficient for REMITTANCE is consistent with the 
argument that the market provides lessors with opportunities to earn rental income 
while gaining experience in non-farm occupations. 
 
The coefficient estimated for FARMWAGE is statistically significant and positive. If 
differences in farm wages between communes reflect differences in the quality of farm 
labour, this finding supports the view that farmers in communes with higher quality 
labour are more likely to hire additional cropland. Alternatively, it could indicate that 
wages are higher because renting increases profits and the demand for farm labour. The 
coefficient estimated for EXTENSION is statistically significant but its sign, contrary to 
expectations, is negative suggesting that extension services are targeted at communes 
where the marginal productivity of land is relatively low. 
 
Table 4 presents both unstandardised and partially standardised parameters estimated 
for the threshold equations. The partially standardised coefficients "provide the rank 
ordering of the strengths of the relationships of the predictors to the outcome, but cannot 
otherwise be interpreted or used in the same way as standardised coefficients in multiple 
regression" (Menard, 2011, p1416). Importantly, table 4 points to the difference in the 
effect of individual sources of transaction costs between the lessor and the lessee, 
highlighting the asymmetries in transaction costs faced by market participants. 
 
On the supply side of the rental market, the rice zoning index (RICEZONING) appears 
to be the most important source of transaction costs that discourage prospective lessors 
from supplying cropland to the market. Transaction costs stemming from ethnic 
diversity (ETHNICITY) come second in the rank ordering and also have a negative 
effect on market participation. In contrast, improvements in physical infrastructure 
reduce transaction costs and encourage participation by prospective lessors. However, 
as suggested by the rank ordering, the influence of physical infrastructure on market 
participation is weaker than the influence of restrictions on land use and of ethnic 
diversity in the commune. In particular, sources of transaction costs stemming from 
access to telephones (OWNPHONE), the presence of a local radio station 
(RADIOSTATION) and all-weather roads in the commune (CMNROAD) are ranked 
third, fourth and sixth respectively. Registration of land use right certificates 
(ENDOWTITLED), which also encourages participation by prospective lessors, is the 
fifth most important of the significant sources of transaction costs affecting the supply 
side of the land rental market. 
  
 
Table 4: The Relative Importance of Sources of Transaction Costs 
Variables 
Renting-out threshold Renting-in threshold 
Estimates 
Partially 
standardised 
estimates 
Rank  Estimates 
Partially 
standardised 
estimates 
Rank  
Land tenure security  
  
 
 
     
ENDOWTITLED - 0.0032** -0.125  5 - 0.0058** -0.223  3 
RICEZONING  2.14** 0.801  1  0.71** 0.267  2 
LANDDISPUTE  0.027 0.013  10 - 0.14 -0.066  6 
Other sources of transaction costs 
 
 
 
     
OWNPHONE - 0.51** -0.237  3  0.0095 0.004  10 
RADIOSTATION - 0.50** -0.231  4 - 0.031 -0.013  9 
OWNVEHICLE  0.071 0.035  9 - 0.16* -0.080  5 
CMNROAD - 0.21* -0.103  6  0.17* 0.083  4 
CMNMARKET - 0.079 -0.039  8  0.085 0.041  7 
ETHNICITY  0.80** 0.299  2 - 0.56** -0.278  1 
RELIGION - 0.15 -0.073  7  0.080 0.040  8 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level of probability, respectively 
Source:  Computed from VHLSS04 and VHLSS08 
 
Turning to the demand side of the market, ethnic diversity (ETHNICITY) has the 
highest rank ordering but impacts negatively on prospective lessees. Sources of 
transaction costs stemming from land tenure insecurity also appear to be relatively 
important. The rice zoning index (RICEZONING) ranks second followed by the 
registration of land use right certificates (ENDOWTITLED). Whereas zoning 
encourages farmers to hire additional cropland (presumably land that is not zoned for 
rice production), registration of land use rights has the opposite effect. A possible 
explanation is that improved land tenure security has encouraged emerging farmers, at 
least as a first step, to invest in fixed improvements and land-saving technology instead 
of renting in more cropland. The non-significance of land disputes (LANDDISPUTES) 
suggests that the registration of land use rights has indeed served to promote tenure 
security in rural Vietnam. The presence of all-weather roads in the commune 
(CMNROAD) and vehicle ownership (OWNVEHICLE) represent the fourth and fifth 
most important of the significant sources of transaction costs affecting the demand side 
of the rental market. Whereas good quality roads encourage prospective lessees to 
participate in the land rental market, ownership of a motorised vehicle has the opposite 
effect, presumably because it encourages farmers to participate in the off-farm job 
market.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper set out to examine factors that motivate farm household decisions to 
participate in the rental market for cropland in rural Vietnam, the efficiency and equity 
impacts of these transactions, and the efficiency of the market itself. Overall, the 
findings show that the land rental market reduced imbalances in factor endowments at 
the household level by transferring cropland to more effective users, i.e. to those more 
willing and able to farm. The evidence points to an emerging class of commercial 
  
farmers who are using the rental market to consolidate and extend their farming 
operations to benefit from size economies that make investments in knowledge and new 
technology more profitable. Equity advantages were also revealed as cropland 
transferred from relatively land-rich to relatively land-poor households, allowing young 
prospective farmers to ‘scale the agricultural ladder’. There is also some evidence that 
the rental market enabled widows - who have few means of generating farm income - to 
earn rental income or a crop share by renting out their land, and allowed rural 
households to engage in non-farm occupations without losing their land or leaving it 
idle.  
  
However, the findings also reveal significant transaction costs that prevent the cropland 
rental market from functioning effectively. Importantly, the results highlight sources of 
transaction costs that effect lessors and lessees differently, and signal the relative 
importance of their impacts. Drawing on these findings it is recommended that the 
Vietnamese government should complete its very successful land registration 
programme and consider relaxing restrictions on the use of wetlands to grow crops other 
than rice. It should also focus on improving access to all-weather roads as this 
encourages participation on both sides of the rental market whereas better access to 
communications infrastructure was found to promote only the supply side of the market.  
 
Ethnic diversity appears to be a very important source of transaction costs in the land 
rental market. Unfortunately the survey data used in this study did not provide sufficient 
information to explore the reasons underlying this finding. Clearly there is scope for 
more in-depth research into the roles played by social capital and cultural norms. 
Readers are also cautioned that conclusions drawn in this study may have little 
relevance to developing countries where customary tenure institutions constrain the 
rental market as land registration programmes based on imperfect knowledge of existing 
rights tend to aggravate the problem of insecure tenure. In such cases, adaptive 
strategies involving small incremental changes to customary tenure arrangements may 
be a better approach. 
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